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  Abstract- System Dynamics’ (SD) main aim is to study dynamic behavior of 
systems based on causal relations. The other purpose of the science is to design 
policies, both in initial values and causal relation, to change system behavior as we 
desire. Especially we are interested in making system’s behavior a convergent one. 
Although now SD is mainly used in situations of single policy maker, there are major 
parts of situations in which there are multi policy makers playing role. Game Theory 
(GT) is an appropriate tool for studying such cases.GT is the theory of studying multi 
decision-maker conditions. In this paper we will introduce GT and explain how to 
apply it in SD. Also we will provide some examples of microeconomic systems and 
show how to use GT for studying and simulating dynamics of these example 
systems. We will also have a short discuss on how SD can help GT studies. 
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Introduction 
 System dynamics (SD) is a powerful tool for studying dynamics of systems. It can 
be used for studying a great variety of systems including social, economic, political 
systems and etc. What does SD helps us to know? We can list them as following: 
1) SD helps us to simulate a system from its initial state (state at present time) 
and see what will happen next in every step of time.  
2) As SD helps us to foresee future of the system, it can help us to see effect of 
every policy we choose at present. So it helps us in policy making and 
choosing policies to have our system in desires state in future.  
What do we need to use SD? We need to identify causal relations among different 
parts of the system and apply appropriate equations for these relations if we want to 
have quantitative simulations. Note that most of the time we desire system’s long 
term behavior to be a steady state situation. It means we like our systems to be 
stable ones and not oscillating or divergent ones. Now, in most of system dynamics 
applications we consider a single policy maker situation. It means that we are the 
only decision maker of the systems and after our decision others will be forced to do 
certain actions because of causal relations. But this is not the real situation in a large 
number of systems. 
 Game theory (GT) is a common tool in studying distributed systems. GT has a 
widespread application in studying systems, like economic, social, engineering and 
etc. What does GT helps us to know? Here are list of different purpose of applying 
game theory: 
1) Game theory helps us to simulate system with independent decision makers. 
it helps us to see what the outputs of the games are. 
2) Game theory is widely used in designing games (Systems) in which although 
different players take their own action independently but output of the game 
(system) is just as we will. This application of GT is called “Mechanism 
Design”. 
 What do we need to use GT? Game theories main assumption is rationality of the 
players. Here rationality means that every player just acts as to maximize his own 
benefit. Also players are aware of rules of the game and available actions of every 
other players of the game and they use logical deductions to choose their own 
actions. With these basic assumptions we need to define players, actions and payoff 
of every outcome of the game for every player to use GT. Game theory is mainly 
focused on long term behavior of the systems, also focused on finding convergent 
possible outputs of every game. Although game theory is strong in modeling long 
time behavior of systems it tells a few about transient time of the games. Also 
whether game with a special initial condition converge to their convergent output or 
not, and if yes to which of possible equilibrium output they converge. 
It can be seen from above discussion that game theory and system dynamics have 
same purposes and same applications, but each one has some strength point and 
some weaknesses. In a general conclusion we can say SD studies dynamic and 
centralized systems while GT studies static and distributed systems. Mastering in 
both tools and applying both in studying systems can help in better understanding of 
system behavior and make more progress. 
 In this paper we will shortly introduce game theory we will discuss on how to apply it 
in system dynamics. We will provide some examples. Examples are chosen from 
micro economy, because both game theory and system dynamics are widely applied 
in this field. We have assumed that reader is well familiar with SD. So we do not 
explain it. At the end we will mention how SD can be used in game theoretic frame 
work studies. 
 
Brief Introduction to Game theory 
 Game theory is the theory of multi decision maker situations, where every decision 
has direct effect on others preferences and benefits. Game theory has been 
developed to model different kind of games. In a general division we can divide 
games in four groups: 1) strategic games 2) extensive games with perfect 
information 3) extensive games with imperfect information 4) cooperative games 
The base for this division is whether games are with cooperative actions or not, 
whether they are simultaneous or in consequence and whether players have perfect 
information or not. Perfect information is that every player knows others possible 
actions and their preferences on the outcomes of the game. 
In this division the first kind of game, strategic games, are defined as simultaneous, 
non cooperative and with perfect information games. These assumptions make 
these games easier to model. These games are applied in wide area of applications. 
We will continue our discussion on this kind of games. These games consist of 3 
elements: 
   1) a set of players : N={1,2,3,…,n} 
   2) a set of actions for each user Ai, for every i a member of N  
   3) a utility function for every user, ui : A → R, which defines his preference for 
every outcome possible outcome of the game, which are members of A = ×iEI Ai  
 
When the game is played, each player i selects an action from his own set of actions 
Ai. These selections are made without any knowledge of the selections made by 
others.( This is the simultaneous assumption of the game) The selections of all 
players taken together define an action profile, a E A, and each player i receives the 
payoff ui(a). Rationality assumption means each player wants to maximize his own 
payoff. Ordinarily, we assume that a player is not limited to choosing actions directly 
from Ai. Instead, players are allowed to choose “mix strategies” or mixed actions 
which are probability distributions over Ai. But here we do not continue in mix 
strategies. As their simulation is just like pure strategies we limit this paper in pure 
strategies. 
 Once such a game has been defined, game theory defines a solution concept which 
attempts to specify what we should “expect” to occur if rational players play the 
game. The most widely known solution concept is the Nash Equilibrium. For 
convenience, we will sometimes write an action profile a E A as (ai, a−i) where ai 
denotes the action chosen by player i and a−i denotes the actions chosen by 
everyone else.  An action profile a E A is said to be a Nash Equilibrium if for every 
player i E I, and for every a_i from his action set Ai, ui(ai, a−i) ≥ ui(a_i, a−i). 
That is, an action profile is a Nash Equilibrium if no player can gain by unilaterally 
deviating from the specified profile. When players play rationally, they will have Nash 
point as the output of the game if the game just has one Nash equilibrium point. If 
there are more than one Nash points they will converge to one of them as the game 
is played again and again unless the game will not converge to any point. Initial 
actions of players define to which Nash point the game will converge. John Nash 
proved that if mixed strategies are allowed, then at least one equilibrium exists for 
every finite game (A finite game is a game with finite sets I and Ai.) There is an 
important of interpretation of Nash equilibrium and whether it is a steady state 
outcome of a system or not. We are not going to open all respects of the subject but 
we will introduce iterative interpretation of Nash equilibrium: in a simultaneous game 
(strategic one) if we repeat the game such that every player does maximize his 
instant payoff and there is no strategic link in different repetitions of game (players 
can choose every action independent of their previous actions), then the game 
outcome will converge to its Nash equilibrium points or it will diverge. 
 To find Nash points in a game we need to introduce Best Response functions. 
For any a-i action profile chosen by other players we define BRi(a-i) to be the set of 
player i's best actions given a-I, meaning : 
BRi(a-i) = {a*i E Ai: ui(a-i, a*i) >= ui(a-i, ai) for all ai E Ai} 
Now it can be easily seen that a Nash equilibrium is a profile a* of actions for which 
a*i E BRi(a*-i) for all i E N 
what does these mathematic equation tell us is that every player from the 
assumption of rationality, does one of his best response actions to what he thinks the 
others choose as their action profile. Now in Nash point every player’s action is a 
best response to others. So no one could do anything better to increase his payoff. 
For finding Nash points we have to determine every players best response and then 
look for the point where these best response functions ( or mappings) meet each 
other. Now we are ready to apply GT in SD. 
Applying Game theory in System Dynamics 
 Assume the situation in which you are an economic supplier that produces a certain 
good. There are some other suppliers in your market that also product a certain 
good. Now each of you have to decide quantity of your product and the price in the 
market is set from the total products supplied in the market. There is no cooperation 
among  suppliers and each one wants to maximize his own payoff. The question is 
that how much you should set your own product? 
 It can be seen that here there is a multi decision making system. You can also set 
your own policy but you have no power on others’. How can you simulate this system 
and find your best policy? 
 Let’s start from a monopoly example. Consider a monopoly market ( market that has 
only one supplier.) supplier’s quantity of product is shown with  q. the price in the 
market ( with the assumption of market clearance and equilibrium of supply and 
demand) is in relation with q: p=(1000-q)/10. Your cost of product is a function of 
your product, C= -q^2+100*q. the benefit of the supplier is: 
Benefit= p*q-C(q) 
From maximizing your benefit you can find quantity as a function of price. 
 For simplicity of model we assume that supplier supplies his entire stack to the 
market and does not accumulate goods there. Here are the causal loop and the 
model.1 The model is attached in supporting materials.2 There is negative loop 
between price and quantity that makes a converging behavior. 
 
                                                            
1
  All models and simulations are done by Vensim software. 
2
  It is recommended to see models and its parameters’ formulations for a better 
understanding. Please contact the author for access to the supporting files. 
Figure 1: a) causal model for monopoly b) Vensim model for monopoly 
 Here we have used quantity to update price and price to update quantity in every 
step. Here are the results. 
 
Figure 2: monopoly simulation results. 
Now let’s go back to the first question. If consider a 3 supplier market each with a 
producing qi quantity of a certain good. Each one has a cost of Ci(qi)=-qi^2+100*q. 
and the price in the market is set as: p=(900-Q)/10 where Q is total product 
q1+q2+q3. For simplicity of the model assume suppliers supply their entire stack to 
the market. Here rises the problem. We, as supplier number 1, can only set our 
production quantity, q1. But if we want to model the market we must somehow model 
others behavior. Let’s use Game theory and look at the problem again. Here we 
have a strategic game. The players are the 3 supplier. Their set of actions is to 
choose a number larger than or equal tob0: qi>=0. Their payoff for output (q1, q2, 
q3) is: 
Payoff i = qi*p – C(qi)= qi*(900 – q1 – q2 – q3)/10 - (- qi^2+100*qi )   
Suppose that suppliers decide their supplying quantity at the beginning of every 
week. So we can say that suppliers play a strategic game at the beginning of every 
week.  We have simulates the situation like a game. Now GT acclaims that if we 
consider the player to be rational and play rationally, then every player has to choose 
his best response to other players. Let’s find the best response function. According 
to definition we know that best response function is the choice that maximizes the 
payoff. By differentiating the payoff 1 function by q1 variable we have: 
BR1(Q-1)= q1=(10 + (q2+q3)/10) / 1.8 
From symmetry we can say the 2 other best response function is the same. So at the 
beginning go every week suppliers try to make a belief (guess) about others strategy 
and take their own as the best response. This is just the iterative interpretation for 
strategic games.  
Now we can model the game and we are not worry any more of the others policy or 
strategy. We can place their best response as their action (policy). 
Now we want to simulate the situation. Here is the causal loop and Vensim model3: 
                                                            
3
 We have set different initial value for suppliers. 
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Figure 3: multi supplier market a) causal loops b) Vensim model 
We can see the negative loops among total quantity, price and each supplier’s 
quantity which makes a converging behavior. 
Here are the results: 
 
  
 
 Figure 4: multi supplier market simulation results: a) quantity of production of 
players 1,2 and 3 b) price c) total product 
What did we expected to take place? From game theory We expect that the game 
converges to one of its Nash Equilibrium point (if it converges). By finding NE points , 
the point where BR functions meet each other we can see that this game has only 
one NE point and it is: (q1*,q2*, q3*) = (6.25, 6.25, 6.25) and because there is only 
one NE point the game must converge to that. It is completely what we have reached 
from simulations. 
Now let’s consider another example that has more than one Nash equilibrium point. 
Consider another market again with 3 suppliers. The production procedure of the 
good generates pollution which is dangerous for the environment. So the 
government will increase the tax level if the total pollution is more than a certain limit 
to control the pollution. Assume that volume of pollution generated is in a linear 
relation with quantity of production. The price of good is100 and for simplicity of 
model we assume that the only cost for the supplier is the tax. When the total 
production is less than 200 units the tax per unit is 50 otherwise it is 150. Again the 
problem is that we are producer number 1 and have to make policy on our behavior, 
but there are others who make decisions separately. We try to look at the system like 
a game: players are the 3 supplier. Their action set is to choose qi>=0.their payoff is: 
Payoff i=qi*price-qi*tax 
Tax=if (total product>200) then 50 else 150 
The Best Response function for player 1 is: 
BR1 (q1) =min ((200-q1-q2), 0) 
From symmetry the others BR functions are same. Now we use iterative 
interpretation of game theory and consider that suppliers choose their amount of 
production at the beginning of every week simultaneously. So they play a strategic 
game every week. 
Now we can model the game. Here is the Vensim model: 
 Figure 5:  Vensim model for polluting suppliers 
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Here are the results for two different initial value simulations. First we have set (q1, 
q2, q3) = (10,100, 50). In second we have set (q1, q2, q3) = (300,100, 50). 
 
 
 
 Figure 6: results for polluting suppliers with initial set 1 
 
 
  
Figure 7: results for polluting suppliers with initial set 1 
What are the Nash equilibriums of the game? 
Every set (q1, q2, q3) that all qi>=0 and q1+q2+q3=200 is a Nash equilibrium for this 
game, because in these points BR functions meet each other. We see that in above 
examples the total product is always 200 in steady state, this acknowledges our 
belief. But which Nash equilibrium will be our result? This depends on initial value. 
Here is where GT does not have any response, we will discuss this question more in 
next part. 
Now that we have seen some examples we provide a total method for simulating 
multi decision maker system. 
First step is to simulate the system as a game. It means to define players and action 
profiles and payoffs. Note that a system is a game if every player’s action does have 
effect on others’ payoffs. Also note that we have discussed strategic games 
(simultaneous perfect information games) in this paper. If you the decision are not 
simultaneous or somehow sequential, or there is no perfect information situation you 
should use other kind of games. For simultaneous game you should divide time to 
discrete times and assume every player does choose his action at the beginning of a 
time section and cannot change it until it finishes. Also at the beginning of the time 
part every player will assume others will continue their own action for next part 
(making a belief about others actions). Now every player chooses his own new 
strategy as the best response function to his belief. This is the golden point game 
theory helps us in simulating dynamic systems. In fact we have a one step delay 
system in which all players’ decisions together makes their next step decision. 
Your policy here is your first (initial) action. And by setting your policy and making a 
belief about others’ first action you can rub the simulation and see the result. 
Game theory has more to help SD. It helps us to find all steady state situation of a 
system. There may be mistakes in generalizing a steady state of a system for a 
special initial value to other initial values. Also it helps us to see whether our system 
has a steady state or not, and if yes is our willing outcome a steady state or not, 
before we spend time on finding policies to reach our desired steady state. 
Using system dynamics in game theory approaches  
 There are ways in which SD can complete GT. A main problem in GT is to find NE 
points. In fact it is difficult in a lot of our real system. There are some theories on 
existence of NE points for a game. So in systems where we now there are NE points 
we can use SD to find those points. Note that we now an iterative game as 
discussed in iterative interpretation of games will converge to an NE point (if it does 
converge). SD can be even used for testing if there is any Nash point. By running a 
system with iterative steps, in case of convergence of actions we can result that 
there is a Nash and also set the convergence point as NE point of the game. 
 But SD has more to help GT than this. Let’s return to our polluting suppliers’ 
example. The main problem was the NE point we would converge to with a certain 
initial values. It can be generalized to if we converge to NE points or we will diverge 
(infinite amount of production in our examples) or oscillate with an initial value set. 
  Here game theory has no answer and other approaches should be used. SD 
presents a satisfying response by simulating the system step by step. Sometimes we 
have limits in transient time states of a system. Such limits are mostly in engineering 
systems. Here again game theory does not have any guaranty, where as SD shows 
us complete transient time of a system. 
Deduction and future research comments 
 In this paper we discussed how game theory with its abilities to simuate steady state 
in multi decision making systems can help system dynamics. We tried to show this 
via some examples. In fact both game theory and system dynamics are utilities 
necessary for one who wants to study systems. For future works, studying in other 
kind of games and their application in system dynamics are recommended. Also 
there is wide area of applying system dynamics in game theory approaches. 
 
References: 
[1] Mashayekhi. Ali Naghi. 2002. The impact of exchange rate policy on inflation 
rate in an oil-exporting economy. Tehran: Sharif University of Technology. 
[2] Nili. Masoud. 2006. Principles of economy. Tehran: Nashre ney. 
[3] Richmond, Barry. "Systems thinking: critical thinking skills for the 1990s and 
beyond." System Dynamics Review 9, no. 2 (1993): 113-133.  
[4] Forrester, Jay W. "System Dynamics and the Lessons of 35 Years." In A chapter 
for The Systemic Basis of Policy Making in the 1990s. 1991.  
[5] Jack Homer, Rogeilo Oliva. "Maps and models in system dynamics: a response 
to Coyle." System Dynamics Review 17, no. 4 (2001): 347-355.  
[6] Richmond, Barry. "Systems thinking/system dynamics: let's just get on with it." 
System Dynamics Review, 1994: 135-157.  
[6] Sterman, John D. Business dynamics: systems thinking and modeling for a 
complex world. McGraw-Hill, 2000.  
[9] Forrester, Jay W. ""The" model versus a modeling "process"." System Dynamics 
Review, no. 1 (1985): 133-134. 
[10] Osborne. Martin J.2000. An introduction to game theory. Oxford university 
press.  
[11] Osborne. Martin J, Rubinstein, Ariel. 2006. A course in game theory. MIT press. 
[12] MacKenzie. Allen B, DaSilva. Luiz A. 2006. game theory for wireless engineers. 
Morgan & Claypool Publishers’ series 
[13] MacKenzie, Allen B. Wicker, Stephen B.”Stability of Multipacket Slotted Aloha 
with Selfish Users and Perfect Information”. Infocom 2003 
 
 
Mohammad Rasouli was born in Tehran, Iran, on 
September 21, 1987. He received B.S. degree in  
electrical engineering from Sharif University of  
Technology, Tehran, Iran in 2008 (with Honor third  
rank) . He is currently working toward M.S degree 
in Sharif University of Technology (SUT), Tehran, 
Iran. Since summer of 2007, he has been working 
with Dr.Mashayekhi and passed some courses such 
as System Dynamics I, and some courses with Dr.Nilli such an Introduction to 
economy and game theory. He is working on game theory in networks. He also has 
an experience in managing some Projects, and has been head of Sharif University of 
technology students' congress in 2009. 
 
  
 
